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TOPIC II.C.1
MARY J. DAVIS
Summary Adjudication Methods in United States Civil
Procedure
The civil judicial system in the United States is increasingly
characterized not as a claim adjudication system-where the rights
and obligations of competing parties are evaluated factually and le-
gally and, thereafter, determined conclusively-but as a claim man-
agement system-where the court acts as administrator of the
dispute, resolving it through managerial methods that promote com-
promise and settlement.1 Statistics exist which reflect that some-
where between eighty-five and ninety-five percent of the cases filed in
the American federal court system are settled by the parties without
an adjudication of the merits of the claim.
2
MARY J. DAVIS is Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College
of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Peter Hay, an original co-Reporter
for this National Report, whose insights and suggestions were invaluable. In addi-
tion, special thanks go to Eric M. Smith, Class of 1998, College of William and Mary
School of Law, for his research assistance.
1. For a detailed dicussion of this widely recognized transformation, Professor
Judith Resnik provides a thorough study in several articles including Resnik, "Mana-
gerial Judges," 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982); Resnik, "From Cases to Litigation," 54
J.L. & Cont. Probs. 5 (1991); Resnik, "Whose Judgment?: Vacating Judgments, Pref-
erences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth
Century," 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1471 (1994). See also, the scholarship of Dr. Deborah
Hensler of the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, including Hensler, "A Glass Half
Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Per-
sonal Injury Litigation," 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1587 (1995); Hensler & Peterson, "Under-
standing Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis," 59 Brook. L. Rev.
961 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Galanter, "Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote," 55 Md. L.
Rev. 1093, 1100, n. 17 (1996). Professor Galanter does a thorough job studying the
data on tort claim filings, which have caused most of the uproar regarding the ineffi-
ciency and unfairness of the American judicial system, and concludes that the "data,"
which can be characterized as meager, results in "a picture of the litigation system
built of little more than imagination." Id. at 1098. Nonetheless, the data which does
exist shows that most cases that are filed are settled. Id. at 1100. Professor Ga-
lanter's review of the data suggests as well that of the 85% to 95% of cases that do not
go to trial, as many as 25% are terminated through some other form of "adjudication"
which he defines as arbitration, dismissal on the merits or a ruling on a significant
motion that led to settlement. In addition, 3.5% of civil cases filed in federal court
ended "during or after trial," including those settled after commencement of trial. Id.
at 1101, n. 22 (citing 1994 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report tbl. C-4).
While the data are certainly incomplete, and subject to different interpretation, these
numbers are commonly considered substantially accurate. See also, Galanter & Ca-
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The American civil justice system has come under increasing at-
tack over the last several decades on a variety of fronts, primarily
because of its perceived inefficiency, uncertainty and, thus, unfair-
ness to the parties. The widespread public perception, in both the
United States and elsewhere, is of a system in need of reform.3 Much
of the reform effort stems from a concern for the expense and delay
that appears inherent in the system. 4 The General Reporter for the
XVth International Congress on Comparative Law on the topic of
summary adjudication, for whom this article is prepared, inquires
"What procedures exist in your system to minimize delay, and how
might they be improved?" In the American system, certain proce-
dures tend to get blamed for the apparent inefficiency of the system-
other than, of course, the lawyers who bear the brunt of the criti-
cism. 5 Discovery mechanisms, by which information is obtained to
prepare a case for litigation, can prolong the preparation of claims
for ultimate resolution and a lack of aggressive case management
methods by the courts to keep cases on a timely schedule are often
singled out as troublemakers. The dual concerns for timeliness and
expense form the backdrop for the subject of this article, a review of
summary adjudication methods in the United States.6 This article
explains many of the summary procedures currently available in this
hill, "Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements," 46 Stan.
L. Rev. 1339 (1994), Saks, "Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?," 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147 (1992).
3. Much has been written on the need in the United States for civil justice re-
form. The breadth of these issues is well beyond the scope of the article. For a discus-
sion of the scope of the issues requiring reform and the history of reform efforts, see
Stiefel & Maxeiner, "Civil Justice Reform in the United States-Opportunity for
Learning from 'Civilized' European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?," 42
Am. J. Comp. L. 147, 151-55 (1994)(summarizing the pressure for reform in the 1990's
and identifying various proposals toward that end); Walpin, "America's Failing Civil
Justice System: Can We Learn from Other Countries," 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev 647
(1997).
4. See Steifel and Maxeiner, supra n. 3 at 151-52 (referencing, among others, a
Report from the President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Re-
form in America (1991) and U.S. Congress, Report of the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee (1990)).
5. Criticism of the legal profession in the United States has been widespread in
recent years. Examples of articles in the public press include, "Number of Law Grad-
uates Slips," Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1996; Chapman, "When Public Ignorance is Good for
Lawyers," Chi. Tribune, June 25, 1995.
6. The workload of courts in the United States is divided between the two paral-
lel court systems-those in the federal system and those in each of the fifty states.
Because many of the state systems use procedural rules modeled after those used in
the federal system, based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this article will
focus on summary adjudication methods in the federal courts. As stated in the 1994
National Report to the XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law, on mass
torts in the United States, "[any report on American law is in a very real sense itself
a comparative law study, and is further complicated by the nature of the federal polit-
ical structure of the United States." Peterson & Zekoll, "Mass Torts," 42 Am. J. Comp.
L. 79, 80 (Supplement 1994). Where possible, any important state law variations will
be identified.
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country that are intended to promote a fair and efficient resolution of
disputes in advance of, or in lieu of, a full-blown adjudication on the
merits. This article addresses whether these procedures are ade-
quate to the task of promoting an efficient and fair judicial system.
Adjudication of claims under the American judicial system is
widely recognized to be more complex than its European and interna-
tional counterparts for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is
this legal system's dedication to party autonomy in the investigation
and control of the dispute resolution process. 7 Our use of the jury
trial in civil cases, our contingency fee system for the payment of law-
yers who press personal injury claims and our constitutional due pro-
cess of law requirements all contribute to the procedural complexity
of the American system.8 Personal injury claims are the most subject
to criticism by civil justice reformers because of the occasional exorbi-
tant verdicts rendered under our trial-by-jury system,9 and the sig-
nificant compensation for the lawyers that results from the
contingency fee system of lawyer compensation. 10 Further, the po-
tential for the filing of unmeritorious claims because of the high rate
of settlement causes concern to observers of the American judicial
system because of the undue pressure to settle such claims that
7. Steifel & Maxeiner, supra n. 3, at 161-62. (Discussion of complexities in
American judicial system compared to European systems). See also Cortese &
Blaner, "Civil Justice Reform in America: A Question of Parity with our International
Rivals," 13 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 1 (1991)(comparing the inquisitorial German and
Japanese judicial systems with the adversarial American and British civil justice sys-
tems). On the American civil procedure system generally see Fleming James, Geof-
frey Hazard & John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure §§ 1.7, 1.8 (hereafter James et. al.,
Civil Procedure).
8. The vastly different procedures used in the American judicial system as com-
pared to continental systems have been explained in a variety of articles and books
which include Alan Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United
States 97-109 (2d ed. 1983). On judicial process generally see Mauro Cappelletti, The
Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (1989). The many areas of difference are
beyond the scope of this article but two very important ones must be identified. The
first stems from the very nature of the American judicial system which includes two
parallel judicial systems, federal and state, as mentioned supra n. 6. The second is in
the manner by which claims are proved through the offering of oral witness testimony
whose presentation is controlled by the parties and not the judge. See Herzog, "The
Probative Value of Testimony in Private Law," 42 Am J. Comp. L. 275 (1994).
9. The United States Constitution, amendment VII, provides for a trial by jury
as of right in all civil cases at law.
10. Literature on attorneys fees in the United States includes: Bebchuk & Guz-
man, "How Would You Like to Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrange-
ments on Settlement Terms," 1 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 53 (1996); Hay, "Contingent
Fees and Agency Costs," 25 J. Legal Stud. 503 (1996); Schwartz & Mitchell, "An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation," 22 Stan. L. Rev.
1125 (1970); Painter, "Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a
Market For Champerty?," 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 625 (1995). On the contingency fee
system of lawyer compensation and proposals to adopt in this country the "English
Rule" that the "loser" pays, see Steifel & Maxeiner, supra n. 3, at 153. On lawyers in
the American judicial system generally see James et. al., Civil Procedure, supra n. 7
at §1.3
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stems from the expense of litigating in a costly, slow court system.
These factors combine to make personal injury claims appropriate to
use for the framework by which to explain the present summary ad-
judication procedures available.
This article uses one of the high profile mass tort cases of recent
decades, the complex silicone gel-filled breast implant products liabil-
ity litigation, to evaluate summary adjudication measures. Recogniz-
ing that not all claims filed are complex tort claims (just the most
interesting ones), where commercial claims present the opportunity
for use of summary proceedings, those will be discussed as well, par-
ticularly regarding mechanisms by which security for a creditor-
plaintiffs claim can be obtained prior to a favorable verdict.11
While preparing this Report, it became clear that the author has
a particular view of what constitutes a "summary adjudication" pro-
cedure, but that others, with different backgrounds and experiences,
may have an entirely different view.12 For example, alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms like arbitration and mediation, so popu-
lar in this country, are not "summary adjudication" procedures to
many because they do not "adjudicate," in a judicial sense, the rights
and obligations of the parties; they, instead, resolve the dispute with-
out a legal imprimatur on the result. 13 Similarly, many trial-an-
nexed procedures like summary jury trials and discovery hearings
are not adjudications because they are mechanisms which enable the
parties to prepare and evaluate the claims, not dispose of them,
though they do impact the ultimate disposition of the claims. A full
and complete report, however, needs to include a broad range of sum-
mary procedures that not only adjudicate the rights and obligations
of the parties, but that also significantly affect the relative positions
of the parties in other critical, though tangential, ways. Conse-
11. See infra nn. 46-53 and accompanying text.
12. I admit to a certain tort focus on what constitutes a "summary adjudication"
procedure as a result of other scholarship in the mass tort and products liability
fields. See, e.g., Davis, "Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions," 77 Ore.
L. Rev. No. 1 (forthcoming 1998). The original co-Reporter on this topic, Professor
Peter Hay, kindly reminded me that not all actions are tort actions and that it would
be beneficial to open up my view of what constitutes a "summary procedure" for the
benefit of the readers of this Report. I am indebted to Professor Hay for his observa-
tions generally, but particularly for this point.
13. Arbitration is the resolution of a dispute through the binding decision of a
person or panel designated by the parties and is typically agreed to in advance by the
parties, through contract, as the preferred dispute resolution mechanism. See, James
et. al., Civil Procedure supra n. 7, § 5.21, at 288-90. The topic of arbitration mecha-
nisms is well beyond this article's scope for many reasons but, in this author's view,
primarily because such procedures are often not "summary" in either duration or ex-
pense, and because they act as a parallel adjudication mechanism and not as an ab-
breviated one within the judicial system. Even though in many arbitrations the
result is a judicially enforceable judgment on the merits, just like a court-rendered
judgment, such an "adjudication" is not before a judicial officer of the court and is
unlikely to be summary. On arbitration generally, see Edward Brunet & Charles
Craver, Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Advocate's Perspective, ch. 8 (1997).
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quently, this Report explains a broad range of available procedures
that either (1) affect a party's rights prior to a full-blown adjudication
by jury trial, including obtaining preliminary orders which affect a
party's conduct or which provide security for payment of any ulti-
mate judgment that might be awarded; (2) provide a strategic advan-
tage that significantly affects the rights involved in the dispute,
through pre-trial investigation and discovery; or (3) summarily dis-
poses of the claim as a final determination of the legal rights and
obligations involved.
Consistent with this definition of the summary proceedings to be
explored, the article will proceed as follows. Part I will set out the
mass tort framework for discussing the procedures and explain
briefly the typical full-blown trial process by which to compare the
summary proceedings to be explained. Part II will elaborate upon
the pre-claim, or provisional, mechanisms by which claimants can ob-
tain either (1) security for the claims in issue or (2) prevent another
party, typically a defendant, from engaging in conduct which is the
subject of the claim. Part III will discuss the pre- and post-filing
mechanisms by which parties obtain information to aid in prosecut-
ing their claims and defenses and thereby obtain a possible strategic
advantage at later adjudication proceedings. Part IV discusses post-
filing procedures used to test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs
claims. These are the "Rule 12(b) motions" found in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Federal Rules") which govern the civil
process in all United States federal courts. 14 Finally, the summary
judgment proceeding under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules, 15 which
14. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, amended significantly
again in the mid-1960s and again in 1993, are the beginning place for a discussion of
all procedures in the United States because of their force in federal courts but also
because most state procedural statutes are modeled after them. A history of the Fed-
eral Rules is beyond the scope of this article but articles on that topic include, Marcus,
"Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure," 50 U. Pitt L. Rev. 725 (1989); Subrin, "How Equity Con-
quered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,"
135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1987). See also, James et. al., Civil Procedure supra n. 7, at
§1.8.
The Rule 12 motions are lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1); lack of jurisdiction over the person, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); improper
venue, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3); insufficiency of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4); insuffi-
ciency of service of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5); failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); and failure to join a party under Rule
19, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). These motions are summary in nature in that they are
decided on the contents of the pleadings. If in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion the court accepts
matters outside the pleadings, the motion is converted to a motion under Rule 56 for
summary judgment and treated accordingly.
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In addition to traditional summary judgment motions that
test the sufficiency of the plaintiffs factual case, evidentiary hearings routinely pre-
cede such motions in an effort by one of the parties to keep from jury consideration
evidence that may support a claim or defense, usually a claim, but that is, for eviden-
tiary reasons, not relevant or helpful to the jury. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the United States Supreme Court defined the
19981
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tests the legal basis of plaintiffs claims after full development of the
facts has taken place through pre-trial discovery, is discussed in Part
V. Additional non-traditional mechanisms to manage the claims pro-
cess are discussed in Part VI.
I. MASS TORTS AND THE COMPELLING NEED FOR SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION
The rise of instances of mass torts provides perhaps the most
compelling reason for the use of summary adjudicatory procedures.
While summary adjudication methods significantly impact all cases
to which applied, their greatest impact is very likely in the mass tort
case. While the summary proceedings available in federal courts are
quite varied in scope, they fit uneasily with the large number of per-
sonal injury claims which present themselves in the context of wide
geographical and temporal dispersement of harms that characterize
the mass tort. 16 The criticisms of delay and expense that barrage the
civil justice system in America speak especially loudly to the mass
tort case in which prolonged discovery disputes prevent many plain-
tiffs from living long enough to obtain a judgment. Further, defend-
ants find the relitigation of issues of culpability takes an enormous
amount of court and counsel time and effort, as does the expensive,
repetitive American discovery process used to obtain information
with which to pursue the claim.17 The judicial management task of
handling thousands of cases creates large burdens on the court per-
sonnel as well. Without some summary adjudication mechanisms,
justice would rarely be dispensed.
Yet, the summary adjudication mechanisms in the federal courts
were created for a different time and respond to the dedication to
party autonomy that permeates so much of the American legal tradi-
tion.18 Without such procedures, however, the mass of litigants
seeking redress through the courts would soon overwhelm the capac-
evidentiary standard for the admissibility of expert testimony and federal judges
must evaluate the legal sufficiency of such evidence prior to considering a summary
judgment motion, if requested. These Daubert hearings act as summary adjudica-
tions because of the dispositive effect a finding of inadmissibility has on a claim in
many circumstances. Daubert hearings are discussed infra at n. 118.
16. For a discussion of the characteristics of mass torts, see Peterson & Zekoll,
supra n. 6; Hensler & Peterson, supra n. 1.
17. Cortese & Blaner, supra n. 7, at 13-15 (discussing Anerican evidence gather-
ing process, known as discovery, and identifying possible reforms).
18. Aggregation methods have been proposed to deal with the thousands of cases
presented by mass tort claims. A full discussion of these methods is beyond the scope
of this article, though on this topic see Davis, supra n. 12; Symposium, "Summing up
Procedural Justice: Exploring the Tension Between Collective Processes and Individ-
ual Rights in the Context of Settlement and Litigating Cases," 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
785 (1997); Symposium, "National Mass Torts Conference," 78 Tex. L. Rev. passim
(1995).
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ity of the federal courts to dispense justice in all cases, not just mass
torts. 19
A. The Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation
In 1992, United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Commissioner David Kessler banned silicone-gel-filled breast im-
plants. 20 The banned implants had been available for over thirty
years, with an estimated one to two million American women having
the implants.
21
The ban by the FDA precipitated a flood of litigation in both fed-
eral and state courts on the same scale as previous mass tort litiga-
tion such as Agent Orange,22 asbestos, 23 Bendectin, 24 and DES.
25
The breast implant litigation encompasses every issue involved in
complex litigation from judicial administration difficulties, under the
19. Examples of the significant numbers of mass tort claims in the last decades
are easily found. Over 325,000 claims were filed in federal bankruptcy court against
A. H. Robins Pharmaceuticals arising out of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device by
1986. Deborah R. Hensler et al., Trends in Tort Litigation: The Story Behind The
Statistics 10 (1988). In addition, the asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits con-
tinue to plague the federal courts. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct.
2231 (1997)(discussion of history of asbestos claims in federal courts; striking down a
settlement class intended to deal finally with all remaining such claims).
20. Marcia Angell, Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law
in the Breast Implant Cases (1996).
21. Id. at 19.
22. For the history of the Agent Orange litigation, which arose out of alleged inju-
ries to United States servicemen exposed to the exfoliant Agent Orange used in the
Viet Nam war, see "A Cover-up on Agent Orange?," Time, July 23, 1990, at 27; and
"Agent Orange Redux," Time, August 9, 1993, at 51. On the proof of causation of
Agent Orange Related illness, see In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,
597 F.Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
23. The asbestos personal injury litigation is legendary in the United States be-
cause of the sheer number of cases over the last thirty years, estimated at over several
million, and because of the classic mass tort profile it suggests-widespread temporal
and geographical dispersement of claims with injuries that have a long latency period
and a large number of possible tortfeasors responsible for the harm. On the asbestos
litigation generally see Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997)(pro-
viding history of litigation in context of decertifying a class action of all future injury
claimants). Numerous articles and texts have been written on the subject. The litiga-
tion is summarized in David Owen, John Montgomery & W. Page Keeton, Products
Liability and Safety, at 963-64 (3d ed. 1996).
24. On the Bendectin litigation, which stems from the use in the 1970s and 1980s
by pregnant women of the anti-miscarriage drug Bendectin and allegations of birth
defects in the offspring of such women, see Michael D. Green, Bendectin and Birth
Defects: the Challenges of Mass Toxic Substances Litigation (1996).
25. DES, or diethylstilbesterol, was an anti-morning sickness drug used by many
women in the 1950s through 1970s and which allegedly caused a variety of illnesses
in the children of such women, particularly cancers. DES has spawned thousands of
cases but because of the difficulty in identifying the manufacturer of the DES taken
by particular women, most cases have had to use innovative, and often unacceptable,
theories of causation. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.
1980)(recognizing market share liability upon which plaintiffs could proceed) and
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990)(rejecting market share liability
and summarizing its reception in other jurisdictions).
19981
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Federal Multidistrict Litigation statute which authorizes consolida-
tion of many similar cases for coordinated discovery, 26 to joinder
mechanisms like class actions under Federal Rule 2327 to aggregate
the claims for a single resolution, to simple negligence actions in
state courts by individual plaintiffs. By mid-1995 when a settlement
was being negotiated to resolve a class action in federal court over the
breast implant litigation, approximately 440,000 women had filed
claims, almost 20% of the total population of women with breast im-
plants.28 The breast implants were made by only a handful of compa-
nies, primarily Dow Coming Corp. which in May 1995 filed for
protection from its creditors under the federal bankruptcy laws as a
result of the large number of breast implant claims filed against it.29
After the Dow Corning bankruptcy, cases continued to be filed
against the remaining manufacturers and against Dow Corning's
parent company, Dow Chemical. The companies have had a number
of recent successes by obtaining summary adjudications in their favor
on the issue of a lack of general causation between the implants and
the injuries complained of.30 Further, Dow Chemical has obtained
dismissal of approximately 4,000 claims in three states because of an
insufficient legal connection between that company and the product's
manufacturer. 31 The summary adjudication mechanisms have been
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)(authorizing consolidation in one federal district cases in-
volving similar parties and issues for coordinated discovery). The silicone gel breast
implant litigation began as a consolidated case. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant
Liab. Litig., 793 F.Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (authorizing class action treatment for certain types of
cases). On class actions generally, see Davis, supra n. 12; see also Cappalli & Cosolo,
"Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry," 6 Temple Int'l &
Comp. L. J. 217 (1992).
28. Angell, supra n. 20, at 192-93.
29. Many commentators have suggested that bankruptcy is a preferable mecha-
nism for resolving a large number of mass torts in an abbreviated manner, through
the determination of creditor preferences in bankruptcy, personal injury claimants
being considered unsecured creditors. See Coffee, "Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action," 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1457 (1995)(advocating bankruptcy
over judicial process for resolution of mass torts).
The most recent settlement offer to the personal injury claimants, in August 1997
met with significant opposition from company creditors and the claimants. The pro-
posed $3.7 billion plan of reorganization was designed, according to Dow Coming, to
resolve all claims through several flexible settlement options. Dow Corning offered to
set aside $2.4 billion to resolve breast implant claims over a 16-year period. The Com-
pany, continuing to deny liability, offered the settlement "in an effort to bring closure
to the breast implant controversy and obtain overwhelming support for the plan."
Further, the company said, it intended to litigate "aggressively" the merits of claims
brought by women who rejected the latest plan. See, "Dow Coming Bankruptcy Set-
tlement," 6 No. 1 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Breast Implants 3, Nov. 6, 1997.
30. Nocera, "The Reversal of Fortune on Breast Implants," Fortune (Sept. 29,
1997)(chronicling recent defense successes and favorable scientific studies regarding a
lack of causation, leading to summary judgments on that issue).
31. Id. See also, Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Ore.
1996)(expert testimony failed to establish causation; summary judgment granted
under Federal Rule 56; effective date deferred pending report of panel in federal mul-
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effective only in small part, and the judicial system largely seems to
have failed those involved-the injured plaintiffs and the company
which may or may not have caused a large portion of the alleged
harm.
For the purpose of this article the exact medical claims of the
plaintiffs and the specific defenses offered by the defendants are
largely irrelevant.32 Many thousands of claimants are alleging defec-
tive design and marketing of the implants and defendants hotly con-
test that their products are capable of causing the variety of injuries
alleged, which include connective tissue diseases accompanied by a
variety of harms including extreme fatigue, pain, weakness and ar-
thritis. The scientific evidence is in controversy and the size of the
claims can be quite large given the high medical expenses and the
pain and suffering, recoverable as damages in this country, which is
often difficult to evaluate. The following summary of the typical trial
process will aid in appreciating the benefits and burdens of the sum-
mary adjudication procedures available.
B. The Typical Full Trial Process33
Before a complaint is filed in a personal injury action, much in-
vestigation should have been conducted by the claimant and her law-
yer. It is against the Federal Rules, as well as rules of professional
responsibility, to file a complaint that is not well-grounded in fact or
law.3 4 To that end, plaintiffs must investigate the basis for any
claims and conduct informal, limited pre-filing investigations. De-
fendants who are not yet parties to a claim are not under any obliga-
tion to open their doors to a potential claimant under normal
tidistrict litigation in the Northern District of Alabama); In re Breast Implant Cases,
942 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y. 1996)(summary judgment denied with leave to
renew pending additional evidence from panel appointed to study breast implant
evidence).
32. For a discussion of the medical claims see, Angell, supra n. 20, at 21-22, 90-
110.
33. See generally, James et. al, Civil Procedure, supra n. 7, § 1.16, Life History of
a Lawsuit.
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The grounds for violation of this Rule include filing plead-
ings or making representations for an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause
delay in the litigation, and making frivolous legal or factual arguments. Rule
11(b)(1)-(4). If an attorney violates Rule 11, severe sanctions can be assessed such as
monetary sanctions, including attorneys fees of the opposing party, or nonmonetary
directives "sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct." Rule
11(c)(2). Further, Rule 11 imposes on represented parties an objective standard of
reasonableness inquiry in assessing the factual representations made in pleadings or
other papers signed by the party, whether the signature is voluntary or mandatory.
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commun. Enterprise, Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
Before the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules, Rule 11 motion practice had be-
come, to many observers, excessive and unfounded. The 1993 amendments limited
Rule 11 to non-discovery pleadings. See Advisory Committee Note. To the extent
Rule 11 serves to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading, particularly a complaint or
answer, it is also a summary adjudication procedure.
1998]
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circumstances and plaintiffs typically must obtain their information
through other means, including interviewing available witnesses and
other attorneys who may be pursuing claims against the same com-
pany for the same types of claims.
35
Once a claim is filed, through a complaint, the formal litigation
process begins. The defendant must provide a response through an
answer, or under the Federal Rules it has the option of also filing a
Rule 12 motion which tests a variety of legal requirements of the
complaint, including jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter,
service of process, and the legal sufficiency of the allegations them-
selves. 36 The discovery process also begins and under Federal Rules
16 and 26 the parties create a discovery plan to govern the lawsuit
and prepare automatic disclosures of documents and other informa-
tion required under Rule 26. The court may require a scheduling con-
ference for the parties to come together to endorse a plan for the
conduct and conclusion of discovery. 37 Part III will discuss fully the
pre-trial discovery measures that protect a party from potential dis-
covery abuses and require a party to deal with documents and infor-
mation in its possession in a way consistent with its obligations in the
lawsuit.
Upon the completion of discovery, or upon the completion of dis-
covery on certain crucial issues, the parties may move for summary
judgment under Rule 56 to obtain judgment as a matter of law on an
35. Formal mechanisms by which to obtain information from potential parties to
a lawsuit are limited. For a discussion of such pre-filing measures in the Federal
Rules, see infra Part III.
36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(motions testing jurisdiction, service of process, joinder,
claim basis); 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); 12(e)(motion for a more
definite statement).
37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 on "Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management" calls
for a discovery conference to enable the trial judge to enter a scheduling order to limit
the time for joinder of parties, dates for conferences and any other appropriate mat-
ters. Rule 16(b). The conference can consider simplification of the issues, possibility
of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof, timing of
summary adjudication motions under Rule 56, the identification of witnesses and doc-
uments, the need for special procedures for managing potentially difficult or pro-
tracted actions that involve complex issues, and other matters to facilitate the just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of the action. Rule 16(c). The trial judge has wide
discretion under Rule 16 in managing a case.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 is the general discovery rule which outlines the discovery meth-
ods available and describes what matters are appropriate for discovery. Rule 26(a)
defines the required initial disclosures parties must make and includes such things as
the identify of all known individuals likely to have relevant information, the identifi-
cation of all relevant documents in the control of the party, a computation of damages,
and the availability of insurance. Rule 26(a)(2) governs the disclosure of expert evi-
dence and Rule 26(a)(3) details the pretrial disclosures which include a witness list
and an exhibit list for trial. The Rule provides broadly for discovery of any informa-
tion reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Rule
26(b)(1). Mechanisms to protect a party from discovery are also provided under Rule
26(c) allowing a protective order to issue when "justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."
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issue as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact.38 Rule 56
motions are the main vehicle in the federal judicial system for testing
the legal adequacy of the claims or defenses presented and constitute
the paradigm "summary adjudication" procedure.
After the summary judgment proceeding stage has been passed,
the parties continue to complete the pre-trial schedule and conclude
the necessary discovery and other administrative matters to be re-
solved to prepare for trial.39 Part VI of the Federal Rules contains
rules for the conduct of trials, including explanation of (1) the right to
jury trial,40 (2) the availability of consolidated or separated trials,
41
(3) certain matters regarding the taking of testimony42 and (4) the
selection of jurors and the rendering of verdicts.
43
Throughout the process outlined above, opportunities exist to re-
solve critical issues that may dispose of the claim or may provide suf-
ficient tactical advantage that the claim will be disposed of as a
result. In addition, federal judges have worked over the last several
decades at creating alternative mechanisms to increase the efficiency
of the court system particularly regarding mass tort claims, consis-
tent with the federal court's equity powers to do justice.44 Many such
alternative mechanisms act as summary proceedings because they fa-
cilitate the resolution process, though they do not conclusively adju-
dicate an issue. Such procedures, especially useful in mass tort
cases, are discussed in Part VI.
II. PRELIMINARY ORDERS FOR SECURITY OR RESTRAINT
A. Pre-filing Security Measures
Unlike the typical personal injury case, creditors claims seeking
payment of a debt or the turning over of property used to secure a
debt typically do not involve the thorny issues of determining culpa-
bility and causation that cause the judicial system to bog down. In-
38. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(d), (e) govern the content of pre-trial orders.
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38.
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. In many tort cases, the liability phase is often separated
from the damages phase and this is accomplished under Rule 42. Such a separation
of phases of a trial often has the effect of being a "summary-like" proceeding because if
liability is found, cases often are settled before the damages phase begins. Such "bi-
furcated" trials will not be discussed as true summary proceedings in this article,
however.
42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 (Taking of Testimony); 44 (Proof of Official Record-includ-
ing proof of official foreign records); 44.1 (determination of foreign law) and 45 (issu-
ance of subpoenas for witnesses and documents). Rule 45 is also a mechanism by
which documents can be obtained from a non-party before the filing of a possible com-
plaint against that entity and will be discussed infra at Part III.
43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 47 and 48 (jurors); 49 and 50 (verdicts on the facts and as a
matter of law).
44. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ("They [the Rules] shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive administration of every action.")
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deed, a personal injury claimant has no mechanism by which to
secure a future judgment and often the first-claimant-in-time re-
ceives full satisfaction of an award while those later in the queue
often come up empty handed because the judicial system and earlier
verdicts have exhausted the resources of the defendant. A perfect ex-
ample is the breast implant litigation where the first successful plain-
tiffs who recovered millions in judgment were compensated, but those
who came after the bankruptcy of the principal defendant, Dow Corn-
ing Corporation, will receive considerably less in compensation be-
cause of the other demands on the assets of the company in
bankruptcy. Similar tales are told in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy
in the asbestos litigation as well as in the A.H. Robins Pharmaceuti-
cal bankruptcy over the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. Many
personal injury claimants in mass tort cases will recover nothing at
all because their injuries were not manifested early enough in the life
of the litigation to receive an enforceable judgment-the recent set-
tlement class action in the asbestos cases sought to provide a pool of
funds for such future claimants but it was struck down.45
Similar fates are not suffered by creditor claimants. Indeed,
though the debtor may have already exhausted the available funds or
disposed of the property and a judgment may go unenforced, pre-
judgment security mechanisms are widely available to creditors to
place a legal restraint on certain of the debtor's property, and thereby
on the defendant's manipulation of the property, to insure its availa-
bility to satisfy a judgment when/if one is obtained. Virtually every
state has such procedures. 46 The attachment mechanism in particu-
lar is available based generally on the potential that the defendant
will attempt to avoid payment of the debt if judgment is secured. 47
Attachment will issue typically if the defendant is a non-resident, is
absent from the jurisdiction for a length of time, several months usu-
ally, has attempted to avoid service of summons, is about to remove
45. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (1997). Many problems
presented themselves in the settlement class action involving the asbestos future in-
jury claimants, not the least of which was determining a fair proportion of the settle-
ment proceeds for present injury claimants and future injury claimants. For articles
on the settlement negotiations in this action and the possible abuse of the class action
mechanism, see Coffee, supra n. 29; Symposium, "Mass Torts: Serving Up Just Des-
serts," 80 Cornell L. Rev. 811 (1995).
46. See e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules § 6001 (1997)(lists typical provisional
remedies available); 6 Del. Code § 1307 (1997)(same).
47. For typical pre-judgment attachment statutes, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§§ 481.010-493.060 (1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 425.301 et seq. (1997); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law
& Rules §§ 6201 et. seq. (1997); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 61.021-61.023 (1997).
Attachment also may be used as security for litigation pending outside the state
where assets are located. See Barclay's Bank; S.A. v. Tsakos, 543 A.2d 802 (D.C. App.
1988). See generally, James et. al., Civil Procedure, supra n. 7, §§ 5.17, 5.18. There
also exists a federal Debt Collection Procedure by which the United States govern-
ment can obtain prejudgment remedies to secure a debt. 21 U.S.C. § 3001 et. seq.
(1990).
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or has already removed property from the state, or has sold or con-
veyed property with the fraudulent intent to prevent payment to
creditors.
48
These statutes usually require some combination of the following
procedures: a demand in writing at or after the time the suit is filed,
accompanied by a copy of the complaint and summons, stating that
the defendant has a time certain within which to pay the debt or re-
quest a hearing, typically seven to ten days. 49 The creditor also typi-
cally can obtain security before a debt matures if the debtor is about
to depart with intent to defraud the creditors.50 As well, an ex parte
order can issue in favor of a creditor even absent the requisite notice
to the debtor if irreparable injury would result to the creditor if the
order were delayed.51 A procedure to garnish a debtor's wages, either
pre- or post-judgment, is also available in most states by statute and
such garnishment procedures typically involve similar procedures of
notice and hearing.
52
The United States Supreme Court has outlined certain require-
ments, based on the United States Constitution's Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, to provide that a debtor's property rights are
protected with due process of law during these procedures. 53 These
cases involved challenges to a variety of state procedures which
sought to deprive a debtor of property without protecting the debtor's
right to a fair and impartial process. The constitutional require-
ments primarily include adequate notice and an opportunity to be
48. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 425.301(1)(a)-(h). A similar practice in English courts is the
"Mareva" injunction which enjoins a defendant from removing assets from the juris-
diction while an action is pending against it. Mareva Cia Naviera, SA v. Interna-
tional Bulk Carriers, SA, [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A.). See generally Collins, "The
Territorial Reach of Mareva Injunctions," 105 L.Q. Rev. 262 (1989); Maurice Rosen-
berg, Peter Hay & Russell Weintraub, Conflict of Laws 147 (10th ed. 1996)(hereafter
Rosenberg et. al., Conflict of Laws). The Mareva Injunction is also similar to a tempo-
rary restraining order, or TRO, which will be discussed infra nn. 54-61 and accompa-
nying text.
49. Ky. Rev. Stat. at § 425.301(3).The debtor may quash an attachment motion
and request an immediate hearing. Id. at § 425.302.
50. Id. at § 425.306.
51. Id. at § 425.308. The creditor has to post a bond in double the amount of the
claim and if a debtor posts a bond equal to the creditor's claim, including court costs
and attorney's fees, the attachment must be dissolved and property returned to the
debtor. Id. § 425.309.
52. Garnishment, whether pre- or post-judgment, is limited by one part of the
United States Consumer Credit Protection Act, found at 15 U.S.C §§ 1671 et seq.
53. The United States Constitution, am. XIV, provides that states may not de-
prive persons of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court, in inter-
preting what "process is due," has outlined certain requirements with which state
pre-judgment attachment statutes must conform. The cases in which these require-
ments can be found are: Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991); North Georgia Fin-
ishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969). See generally annot., 18 A.L.R. Fed. 223 (1974, 1996).
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heard on the merits of the creditors claim in a timely fashion. 54
Other than the federal constitutional limitations on the attachment
procedure which govern in all fifty states, the applicable state statute
where the action, or attachment proceeding, is pending must be con-
formed with. Because of the primacy of state law in this area, gener-
alities, other than the above brief description of the typical process,
are difficult to make.
B. Pre-filing Restraint Orders
Occasionally, a party will desire not a money judgment but an
order preventing another from continuing with a course of conduct
that either violates the rights of others or has that potential. Such an
order, known either as a preliminary injunction or a temporary re-
straining order, or TRO, is available in federal courts, and most state
courts, under very limited circumstances. It would not likely be used
in a mass tort or personal injury action for reasons to be made clear.
Federal Rule 65 provides for the issuance of such preliminary re-
straint devices. 55 A preliminary injunction seeks to enjoin a party's
conduct and can only issue after notice to the adverse party.56 A
TRO, on the other hand, is an ex parte proceeding in which the order
can issue without written or oral notice to the adverse party only if
(1) immediate and irreparable harm is likely to result, based on the
affidavit of the applicant, and (2) the attorney certifies the efforts
made to give notice or reasons supporting why notice should not be
required.5 7 Any such order expires by its terms within a specified
number of days not to exceed ten. A preliminary injunction hearing
must be scheduled to take place at the earliest possible time after
issuance of the TRO. In addition, security must be given by the
applicant.5
8
Because of the potentially drastic consequences which may stem
from the issuance of a TRO, judges are quite reluctant to issue such
an order absent notice. According to the Advisory Committee Notes
to Federal Rule 65, "Many judges have properly insisted that, when
time does not permit of formal notice of the application to the adverse
party, some expedient, such as telephonic notice to the attorney for
54. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 15.
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(preliminary injunctions) and 65(b)(TRO's).
56. Id. at R. 65(a)(1). The preliminary injunction is often the primary remedy
sought by a party and once it issues the dispute is often considered resolved. Conse-
quently, the federal trial judge has the power to consolidate the trial of the action on
the merits with the preliminary injunction hearing and resolve the matter. Prelimi-
nary injunction motions, therefore, frequently turn into adjudications of entitlement
to permanent injunctions. On the remedy of injunction generally, see James et. al.,
Civil Procedure supra n. 7, at § 5.16.
57. Id. at R. 65(b).
58. Id. at R. 65(c).
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the adverse party, be resorted to if this can reasonably be done."59
Because of the equitable nature of the remedy, the grounds upon
which a TRO will be issued vary, but are all intended to prevent an
alleged irreparable harm from occurring. The established standards
for allowing preliminary injunctive relief apply in the TRO context as
well. Those considerations are: (1) the likelihood that plaintiff will
prevail on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable injury to plaintiff if
no injunction is issued; (3) the degree of harm that an injunction
would cause to the defendant; and (4) the public interest.60 A wide
variety of conduct may be subject to a TRO including (1) the defend-
ant's violation of a trademark by marketing protected goods, (2) the
defendant's marketing of goods in a geographic area or under circum-
stances which violate an exclusive right in the claimant, or (3) the
defendant's violation of a covenant not to compete agreement in the
employment context. 6
1
Some questions about whether a court can order a TRO to pre-
vent the defendant from dealing with its assets in the jurisdiction, to
protect a judgment that may subsequently be obtained, have been
raised. Most federal circuits consider such an injunction, like the
English Mareva Injunction, to be consistent with Rule 65, and have
permitted such an injunction. 62 For example in Republic of Philip-
59. Id. Advisory committee note. The informal notice requirement may be consti-
tutionally compelled in some circumstances, as when the adverse party's First
Amendment right to freedom of speech is implicated. Carroll v. President and Com-
missioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
60. See e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974); American Board of Psychia-
try & Neurology v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1 (D.C. Civ. 1997)(preliminary injunc-
tion under federal trademark statute); Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enter., 112 F.3d
689 (3d Cir. 1997)(injunction against Russian exporter of grey market goods); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Salvano, 999 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1993)(TRO issued
in employment dispute at securities firm). William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1976)(injunction sought for unfair com-
petition under federal statute). See also, Leubsdorf, "The Standards for Preliminary
Injunction," 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (1978).
61. See generally, cases cited supra n. 59; James et. al., Civil Procedure, supra n.
7 § 5.16. Additional statutes in both the federal and state systems provide for the
issuance of injunctions under statutorily described circumstances. Such statutes in-
clude, 28 U.S.C. § 2283(anti-suit injunction to prevent the prosecution of claims in a
parallel state court proceeding); 28 U.S.C. §§1253, 2101, 2281, 2284 (injunctions
against the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state or federal statutes).
On the federal anti-suit injunction act, 28 U.S.C. § 1783, which permits a federal
court to enjoin a state proceeding only when authorized by Act of Congress, where
necessary to aid its jurisdiction or to protect its judgments, see Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972). On anti-suit injunctions generally, see Edwards, 'The Changing
Notion of Our Federalism'," 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1015 (1987); Del Duca & Zaphiriou,
"Rules for Declining to Exercise Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters: Forum
Non Conveniens and Lis Pendens," 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 245, 263-73 (1994).
62. See, Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 760 F.2d 1300, 1309 (D.C.Cir. 1985);
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 1990). Such an
injunction was used in a case arising out of the recent BCCI Holdings financial scan-
dal. BCCI Holdings v. Mahfouz, 1993 WL 45221 (D.D.C. 1993). On the effect of
Mareva Injunctions on the jurisdiction of the United States courts, see United States
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pines v. Marcos,63 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a pre-
liminary injunction forbidding the Marcoses, former first family of
the Philippines, from encumbering real property located in New York
which allegedly had been purchased with funds improperly taken
from the Philippines. The injunction was intended to aid in the Phil-
ippines government's attempt to recover monies wrongfully taken
during the Marcos' reign of power. In a related case, a preliminary
injunction was granted by a California federal court against the Mar-
coses personally to prevent them from transferring assets wherever
located, including assets in banks in foreign countries. 64 Jurisdiction
over either the defendant or his/her property is sufficient to permit
such an injunction to issue.
65
III. PRELIMINARY DISCOVERY MECHANISMS
In the silicone gel breast implant litigation, as in most mass tort
cases, the claim will frequently be successful or not depending on the
information obtained through the discovery mechanisms available to
obtain information to substantiate the plaintiffs claims. Indeed,
when allegations of product defect have such serious consequences of
huge potential liability to hundreds of thousands of claimants,
whether a particular plaintiff can prove her case impacts every subse-
quent case. The information obtained in discovery will likely be
made available to other claimants through both attorney cooperation
and because any given plaintiffs attorney is likely to have a large
number of clients. It is too expensive to take one such case and pre-
pare it for trial. Many plaintiffs' law firms try to handle a large
number of cases of the same type of injury against the same defend-
ant or group of defendants to create economies of scale. 66 Conse-
quently, the documents that are disclosed in discovery in any case
take on great significance.
One of the many complaints about the judicial machinery's ineffi-
ciency comes from the protracted battles over discovery. The 1993
amendments to the Federal Rules sought to simplify discovery by re-
v. All Funds on Deposit in any Accounts Maintained in the Names of Meza or Castro,
856 F.Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)(Mareva injunction supported civil forfeiture action
against bank accounts of international drug trafficking organization). On the enforce-
ability of a Mareva Injunction against assets in this country, see Guiness PLC v.
Ward, 955 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1992)(enforcement of Mareva injunction upheld).
63. 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986).
64. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. See, e.g., United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965)(court
properly enjoined New York national bank from releasing or transferring accounts
belonging to taxpayer even though corporation's accounts were located outside the
United States at a Uruguayan branch). The injunction can not only freeze assets but
require that they be brought into court. In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406 (2d
Cir. 1985).
66. On the nature of mass tort litigation and the effect that the large number of
claims has on the litigation, see Hensler and Peterson, supra n. 1 at 1018-26.
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quiring certain items to be disclosed automatically. 67 In addition, the
parties are required to meet to form a discovery plan to anticipate the
areas that may prove troublesome and plan for them.
68
In product liability-based mass tort actions, the plaintiffs case on
liability may depend on the discovery of information contained in the
records of the defendant manufacturer which displays proof of a dis-
regard for the health and welfare of the consumer of the product or
which suggests other culpability regarding the product's design and
manufacture. Such documents will only be found in the defendant's
possession and the plaintiffs will necessarily seek to review all docu-
ments remotely likely to produce such information. There are several
mechanisms by which documents, tangible things and real property
can be inspected of both a party and a non-party.
Federal Rules 34 and 45(a) provide for the production of docu-
ments and things or permission to enter upon land or other property
of both parties and non-parties.69 Typically, the party seeking to re-
view documents must wait for the discovery conference required in
Rule 26(d) unless a party seeks a court order to proceed before that
conference. 70 The trial judge has wide discretion to deal with discov-
ery issues and if it appears that a defendant is about to destroy docu-
ments that may be discoverable, it would be appropriate for a trial
judge to order an earlier inspection though it would be highly unu-
sual for an order to issue ex parte.71 Plaintiffs must itemize the in-
formation sought to prevent a "fishing expedition" of defendant's
records.
72
Non-parties are subject to document and premises inspection re-
quests under Rule 45 which authorizes a subpoena duces tecum to
issue for the production or inspection of documents or tangible things
67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). These items are described supra n. 37.
68. Id. Rule 16.
69. Id. Rules 34, 45.
70. Id. Rule 26(d). In English practice, a similar device is the Anton Piller Order,
which takes its name from Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Process, Ltd., [19761
Ch. 55, [1976] 1 All E.R. 779 (C.A.), which issues ex parte and permits the successful
movant to search the opponent's premises to secure and safeguard evidence in danger
of destruction or loss. I am indebted to Professor Hay who acquainted me with the
Anton Piller Order. More on these Orders can be found in Dockray & Laddie, "Piller
Problems," 106 L.Q. Rev. 601 (1990). See also, Rosenberg et. al., Conflict of Laws,
supra n. 48, at 147.
71. Interestingly, the Anton Piller order, discussed supra n. 70, issues ex parte
and can produce documents which may then become the basis of a Mareva injunction
prohibiting the defendant from dealing with assets. Such a result is very unlikely to
result in this country given the very stringent notice requirements in both our discov-
ery and injunction practice.
72. Id. Rule 34(b). Failure to comply with a discovery request or order can lead to
the sanctions provided in Rule 37 which include dismissal of claims or defenses, the
assessment of fines and costs, a finding of fact unfavorable to the noncomplying party
regarding the subject matter of the request and others in the trial judge's discretion.
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or to permit inspection of premises. 73 Persons subject to such subpoe-
nas are protected under Rule 45(c) which defines the method by
which objections can be raised to the subpoena. Typical objections
are that a reasonable time for compliance was not provided, the sub-
poena requires excessive travel, requires disclosure of otherwise pro-
tected matter or subjects the person to an undue burden.
74
Parties who must comply with the broad discovery permitted by
Rule 26 often seek to limit the use of discoverable material or to pre-
vent its subsequent disclosure. For example, trade secrets or other
commercially sensitive information may have to be disclosed in dis-
covery but its widespread dissemination might harm the defendant
financially or competitively. Consequently, Federal Rule 26(c) per-
mits the court to enter a protective order to limit the use of certain
discoverable material and to prevent its dissemination to non-parties
or others.75 The grounds for such protection include annoyance, em-
barrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.
76
It should be clear that significant protections exist for parties
who want to delay and even prevent the disclosure of damaging infor-
mation. Further, the cost of discovery can be significant but the costs
are balanced against the benefit of greater information availability.
One commentator has described the balance this way:
Most of the modern law of discovery is an accommodation
between affording full and open discovery and safeguarding
against unrestrained rummaging through an opponent's
files, imposition of oppressive expense, or invasion of the op-
ponent's preparation for adversarial trial. On the whole, a
satisfactory balance is struck, but the scope of discovery re-
mains a dilemma in two types of litigation: "big" cases (in-
volving millions of dollars in damages), in which the stakes
are so large that the parties have incentive to exhaust every
possibility of unearthing or withholding additional evidence;
and "little" cases (involving say $50,000 or less) in which one
party has an incentive to overpower the other by protracted
discovery beyond the value of the case and thereby deterring
similarly situated persons from maintaining similar
litigation.
77
73. Id. Rule 45(a)(1)(C). The procedures are outlined in Rule 45(a)(2), (3) and
45(b).
74. Id. Rule 45(c). A court can modify or quash a subpoena under these conditions
or can create special conditions under which the subpoena is to be fulfilled. Rule
45(c)(3)(B). See generally James et. al., Civil Procedure, supra n. 7, § 5.14.
75. Id. Rule 26(c).
76. Id. The Rule provides a trial court with several mechanisms by which to pro-
tect a party. The disclosure can be prevented entirely, limited to specified terms and
conditions, limited to certain subjects, conducted by court-selected persons, or sealed
by the court. Id.
77. James et. al., Civil Procedure, supra n. 7, § 5.2, at 236-37.
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Discovery mechanisms can have a powerful summary adjudication
effect.
IV. PRELIMINARY MOTIONS THAT CHALLENGE THE LEGAL
SUFFICIENCY OF THE CLAIMS
A. Rule 12(b) Motions
The Federal Rules permit an early challenge to the legal suffi-
ciency of the allegations of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and (c).
7 8
When a defendant challenges the plaintiffs legal entitlement to the
relief demanded, even if all well-pleaded facts are taken in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, Rule 12(b)(6) permits a judgment as a
matter of law in favor of the defendant. Such motions challenge the
plaintiffs pleading of the required legal elements of the claim-as one
court recently put it, "Like a battlefield surgeon sorting the hopeful
from the hopeless, a motion to dismiss invokes a form of legal triage,
a paring of viable claims from those doomed by law."7 9 If any legal
requirement of the claim is not plead, the motion should be
granted.80 For example, if a plaintiff seeks to recover on a tort theory
but fails to allege that the defendant's actions were the cause of the
plaintiffs harm, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would be appropriate. As one
might assume, leave to amend the complaint is routinely granted in
such circumstances.
81
Of greater importance as a true summary adjudication method,
is the Rule 12(b)(6) motion which challenges the plaintiffs entitle-
ment to relief upon the legal theory pleaded. For example, a plaintiff
seeking recovery under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional
distress under circumstances in which the governing law would not
recognize the cause of action under the facts as pleaded may suffer
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and (c). Additional matters in response may be plead
by motion under Rule 12 as discussed supra n. 36 and accompanying text. The Rule
12(b) motions replace demurrers in common law pleading practice.
79. lacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F.Supp. 562 (D.R.I. 1996). Additional descrip-
tions of the rule follow. "The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) and summary judgment mo-
tions is to conserve judicial resources by screening out at the earliest possible time
those actions in which it can be determined readily that the plaintiff has no chance of
prevailing." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1356 (Supp. 1997).
"The purpose of the rule is to allow the court to eliminate actions that are fatally
flawed in their legal premises and destined to fail, and thus spare litigants the bur-
dens of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity." Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v.
Scimed Life Sys., 988 F.2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Mayer v. Mylod, 988
F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993).
80. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); LRL Properties v. Portage
Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097 (6th Cir. 1995); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus.
Corp.,74 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 350 (11th Cir.
1996).
81. See Wright & Miller, supra n. 79, at § 1357.
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judgment as a matter of law because recovery simply cannot be had
as alleged.
8 2
Rule 12(c) similarly permits an adjudication based purely on the
allegations of the pleadings, the complaint and answer. This motion
is useful when the answer admits the allegations of the complaint, for
example that a debt is owed as claimed, but raises an affirmative de-
fense that is insufficient in law.8 3 In other words, "the court should
not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that plain-
tiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief."
8 4
Both Rule 12 motions are summary proceedings on the merits
because they deal directly with the existence of a meritorious claim or
defense.8 5 When such motions are supported by affidavits or other
evidence outside the allegations in the pleadings, as they typically
are either from deposition testimony or answers to other discovery,
Rule 12(b)(6) and (c) motions are converted into motions for summary
judgment under Rule 56 and are resolved under the standards appli-
cable to that Rule.8 6 . This article addresses Rule 56 motions in full in
Part V.
B. Involuntary Dismissals for Failure to Prosecute
A challenge to the legal sufficiency of the allegations of the claim
or defense is not the only preliminary motion which can result in an
adjudication on the merits. Rule 41 permits a defendant to move for
dismissal of an action for failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the
claim.8 7 A dismissal for such failure operates as an involuntary dis-
missal on the merits preventing the plaintiff from re-filing the claim
later.
82. See, e.g., Dillon v.'Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
83. See James et. al., Civil Procedure supra n. 7, § 4.17, at 219-20.
84. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
85. Examples of such motions can be found in McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d
821 (9th Cir. 1996); Mennella v. Office of Court Administration, 938 F.Supp. 128
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). On Rule 12practice generally see Labaton and Sternberg, Using and
Protecting Against Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) Motions, 4 Practical Litigator 79
(1993); Hamabe, "Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
A Categorization Approach," 15 Campbell L. Rev. 119 (1993).
86. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (c).
87. Id. Rule 41. Subsection (a) permits a plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal
for any reason, without prejudice to refile later unless the plaintiff has already dis-
missed the matter voluntarily once before. Subsection (b) authorizes the involuntary
dismissal which the plaintiff suffers at the defendant's motion or if the plaintiff has
failed to comply with other of the Federal Rules, such as discovery rules for which a
sanction is dismissal. See Rule 37(c).
A defendant can certainly suffer a similar fate, though an "involuntary dismissal"
as to a defendant is termed a default judgment. Defendants who have not answered
the complaint within the required number of days from filing can suffer a default for
such failure to respond. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. A default judgment may be set aside
for "good cause shown." Id. Rule 55(c).
[Vol. 46
SUMMARY ADJUDICATION METHODS
The types of failures to prosecute which result in such a harsh
sanction are quite varied. A decision to dismiss is within the trial
judge's discretion because he or she most familiar with the history of
the prosecution of the claim.8 8 The factors upon which an involun-
tary dismissal are to be judged include (1) the duration of the plain-
tiffs failures, (2) whether plaintiff had received notice that further
delays would result in dismissal, (3) whether the defendant is likely
to be prejudiced by further delay, (4) whether the district judge has
taken care to strike the balance between alleviating court calendar
congestion and protecting a party's right to due process and a fair
chance to be heard, and (5) whether the judge has adequately as-
sessed the efficacy of lesser sanctions.89
Typically, the attorneys for the plaintiff are to blame for the de-
lay in prosecution. Should a claimant be responsible for his attorneys
lack of diligence by suffering a dismissal on the merits? The courts
have taken very different approaches, perhaps reflecting the very
case specific nature of the involuntary dismissal motion. For exam-
ple, in Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co.,90 the court observed that
"Dismissals for misconduct attributable to lawyers and in no wise to
their clients invariably penalize the innocent and may let the guilty
off scot-free... When the client has not personally misbehaved and
his opponent in the litigation has not been harmed, the interests of
justice are better served by an exercise of discretion in favor of appro-
priate action against the lawyer as the medium for vindication of the
judicial process and protection of the citizenry from future imposi-
tion."9 1 State court procedures are generally similar but some state
legislatures have tried to give guidance on the outside time period
within which a claim must be prosecuted or suffer dismissal.92
The combination of the wide scope of discovery, and the poten-
tially lengthy time period necessary to conduct discovery in all but
the most simple cases, with the latitude the American court's give to
the parties to investigate, prepare and litigate their own cases based
88. Finley v. Parvin Dohrmann Co., 520 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1975)(appellate review
of dismissal based on abuse of discretion standard).
89. Alvarez v. Simmons Mkt. Research Bureau, Inc., 839 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir.
1988). See also Jackson v. City of New York, 22 F.3d. 71 (2d Cir. 1994)(reversing trial
court's dismissal as abuse of discretion in action involving allegations of abuse by
police officers); Harris v. Callwood, 844 F.2d 1254, 1256 (6th Cir. 1988)("in the ab-
sence of notice that dismissal is contemplated a district court should impose a penalty
short of dismissal unless the derelict party has engaged in "bad faith or contumacious
conduct."); GCIU Employer Retirement Fund v. Chicago Tribune Co., 8 F.3d 1195
(7th Cir. 1994)(district court's dismissal must be "fundamentally wrong" to be re-
versed on appeal).
90. 569 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
91. Id. at 123-24. But see, Kung v. Fom Investment Corp., 563 F.2d 1316, 1318
(9th Cir. 1977)(litigants bound by conduct of attorneys absent egregious
circumstances).
92. See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.210, .310 (West 1991).
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on our principles of party autonomy, make the dismissal of cases
under Federal Rule 41(b) a rare occurrence.9 3 The trial judges in this
country are products of the adversarial system and are, therefore, not
unsympathetic audiences for the delaying tactics that might be used
to prolong litigation such as (1) motions for extensions of time to com-
plete discovery, (2) pleas for extra time to prepare dispositive motions
or for trial because of the complexity of the claims in issue, or (3) the
difficulty in obtaining compliance by the other parties in discovery or
in settlement negotiation. The reasons for failures to "prosecute" are
innumerable and thus Rule 41 is largely unsuccessful in encouraging
the prompt litigation of claims. Such is the case especially in the
mass tort, or "big," case that presents a large number of claims, de-
fendants, controversial discovery and contested substantive issues
not likely to be dismissed for failure to prosecute in spite of charges of
delay and lack of diligence.
V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER FEDERAL RULE 56
The Federal Rules provide for a summary judgment proceeding
under Rule 56. Rule 56 allows a party to the litigation to move, with
or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all of or a
portion of the issues. 94 Summary judgment is appropriate under
Rule 56 when there is no genuine issue of material fact on which a
fact-finding by a jury is needed and thus the trial judge can deter-
mine the legal issues as a matter of law. This motion, like the Rule
12(b) motions, tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations but, unlike
the Rule 12(b) motions, facts are presented to support the motion by
which the trial judge can be more fully informed about the nature of
the allegations.
Summary judgment is intended for use when facts can be estab-
lished conclusively without resort to a trial, thereby avoiding useless
trials while still achieving a final determination on the merits.9 5 Rule
56 allows for a motion for summary judgment to be made on the en-
tire complaint or counterclaims, any single claim or counterclaim and
any single issue contained in a complaint or counterclaim. 96 Sum-
mary judgment is accomplished by allowing the parties to introduce
evidence by way of affidavits and items referred to in the affidavits.9 7
It is within the discretion of the court to allow affidavits to be opposed
93. For cases discussing the standard of dismissal under Rule 41(b) see Ferdik v.
Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); annot., 20 A.L.R. Fed 488 (1974 &
Supp. 1997).
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
95. Victory Pipe Craftsman, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
96. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), 56(a).
97. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge and show
the affiant is competent to testify as to the contents and copies of all papers referred
to which shall be attached.)
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by affidavits, depositions, interrogatories or further affidavits. 98 In
some cases, at the discretion of the district court, oral testimony is
allowed to respond to a motion for summary judgment.99
The key, then, to the granting of a summary judgment motion is
that the record discloses that there is no genuine issue of material
fact left for determination by a jury. The standards by which that
aspect of the decision is made are critical and have been explored by
the Supreme Court in a trilogy of 1986 cases, Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
trett, 1 00 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 1 0 1 and Matsushita Elec. In-
dustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.10 2 In these cases, the Supreme
Court fully explored the grounds for summary judgment and the
quality, availability, and evaluation of the evidence which supports
such motions.
The basic requirements are that the movant, typically the de-
fendant since it is challenging the plaintiffs ability to meet her bur-
den of proof, must meet the initial burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the non-
movant's case. 103 This burden may be met by pointing out to the
court that the non-movant, having had sufficient time for discovery,
has no evidence to support an essential element of her case. 10 4 Not
every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of
material fact that requires a denial of summary judgment and the
non-movant must present more than "a scintilla" of evidence to over-
come the motion; there must be evidence on which the jury could rea-
sonably find for the non-movant.10 5 The non-movant cannot rely on
the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a
disputed fact, but must present affirmative evidence in order to de-
feat a properly supported motion. The ultimate inquiry is: whether
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
99. This is accomplished by utilizing Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(e) which authorizes oral
testimony in motions. Thompson v. Mahre,110 F.3d 716, 720 (9th Cir. 1997)(citing 10A
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §2723, at 62 (2d ed. 1983)).
A motion for summary judgment may be made at any time after the expiration of
twenty days from the filing of suit or after service of a motion for summary judgment
from an adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
100. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Celotex Corp. involved the availability of summary judg-
ment in an asbestos personal injury action, a mass tort case, and the issue on which
summary judgement was based was whether the plaintiff had been exposed suffi-
ciently to the defendant's product to permit a finding of causation. Id. at 320.
101. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Anderson involved a defamation action.
102. 477 U.S. 574 (1986). Matsushita was a complex anti-trust action.
103. On the relation of the summary judgment motion and the burden of proof, see
James et. al., Civil Procedure § 4.14
104. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 245 (essential elements are defined by the underlying
substantive law in issue, including evidentiary standard required); see also Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)(federal environmental statutes governed
essential elements; summary judgment appropriate on affidavits as to applicability of
statutory definitions giving plaintiff no right to pursue action under statute).
105. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (weighing of evidence is a jury function; summary
judgment motions do not weigh the evidence).
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the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.1
0 6
The Celotex case provides an excellent example of the circum-
stances supporting summary judgment, particularly in the mass tort
context. The plaintiff's decedent had worked with asbestos during his
lifetime and died allegedly of an asbestos-related illness.10 7 He
claimed exposure to products of 15 named defendants; Celotex moved
for summary judgment based on plaintiffs failure through discovery
to identify the particular Celotex product(s) to which plaintiff claimed
exposure.' 08 Plaintiff had failed, in answer to interrogatories ad-
dressed to the issue, to identify any specific Celotex products but the
decedent, in deposition before his death, had identified Celotex as a
manufacturer of products with which he had worked for a time in
1970-71.109 Celotex moved for summary judgment based on plain-
tiffs failure to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding Celotex' prod-
ucts causing decedent's asbestos-related illness. 110
The Court clarified the standard for granting summary judg-
ment, on which there had been some disagreement in the lower
courts, and made it clear that the moving party need do no more than
point out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party's case."" The non-moving party,
then, must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by
the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,'
designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial."'11 2 It is clear that the non-moving party cannot rest, in defense
of summary judgment, on the laurels of the pleadings and the trial
court's imagination to create factual disputes.
The Supreme Court has been said, in these cases, to have
strengthened the use of the summary judgment motion and made it
easier to obtain for defendants. 1 3 Indeed, in Celotex the Court
states:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50
years authorized motions for summary judgment upon
106. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
107. Id. at 319.
108. Id. at 319-20.
109. Id. at 320. Plaintiff also produced a letter from an official of one of the dece-
dent's former employers that identified Celotex and a letter from an insurance com-
pany to Celotex's attorney's. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 325.
112. Id. at 324. The Court made it clear that the non-moving party need not pro-
duce evidence in an admissible form for trial. Id.
113. James et. al., Civil Procedure, supra n. 7, § 4.15, at 218. See also Issacharolff
& Loewenstein, "Second Thoughts about Summary Judgment," 100 Yale L.J. 73
(1990).
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proper showings on the lack of a genuine, triable issue of ma-
terial fact. Summary judgment procedure is properly re-
garded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as
an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action.' [citations omitted] .... Rule 56 must
be construed with due regard not only for the rights of per-
sons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately
based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a
jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims
and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no fac-
tual basis. 1
14
Summary judgment is appropriate in any case where an undisputed
issue of fact suggests a legal conclusion. 115 Partial summary judg-
ment also is often obtained on single issue matters that can be re-
solved, simplifying the issues to be dealt with at the trial level.11
6
An excellent example of a case where summary judgment is pe-
culiarly appropriate is a patent case where determination of whether
a patent exists or not, and if so, on what matter, is a matter law.
117
Other types of complex litigation, such as antitrust suits,118 many
types of employment and civil rights litigation, 119 and financial
transactions litigation of various character 20 are well suited to mo-
114. 477 U.S. at 327.
115. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Supreme Court has since elaborated on what it
considers to be a factual controversy and has stated that "In ruling on a Rule 56 mo-
tion, 'a District Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the
non-moving party' only in the sense that, where the facts specifically averred by that
party contradicts facts specifically averred by the movant, the motion must be de-
nied.... The purpose of Rule 56 is to enable a party who believes there is no genuine
dispute as to a specific fact essential to the other side's case to demand at least one
sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation continues." Lujan,
497 U.S. at 884.
116. James et. al., Civil Procedure, supra n. 7, § 4.13.
117. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 116 S.Ct. 1384 (1996).
118. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)("sum-
mary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where mo-
tive and intent play leading roles"). But see, of course, Matsushita Electronic
Industrial Co., 475 U.S. 574, which involved an antitrust action, in which the Court
stated: "If the factual context renders respondent's claim implausible... respondents
must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would
otherwise be necessary." Id. at 587.
119. See, e.g., Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)(wage
and hour statute (Fair Labor Standards Act) violation appropriate for summary judg-
ment on coverage of statute to marketing representatives); Rankin v. Wyatt Co., 125
F.3d 55 (7th Cir. 1997)(federal age discrimination action; summary judgment
affirmed).
120. First United Finan. Corp. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 96 F.3d
135 (5th Cir. 1996)(insurance coverage dispute appropriate for summary judgment);
Slamans v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 69 F.3d 468 (10th Cir. 1995)(oil supplier
under distributor agreement with bankruptcy debtor filed action to determine entitle-
ment to proceeds of credit card transactions; summary judgment appropriate on enti-
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tions for summary judgment in spite of their complexity. Any issue
as to which there is no factual controversy, and which therefore re-
quires a certain legal conclusion, suggests summary judgment re-
gardless of the otherwise complex nature of the litigation.
Summary judgment motions are frequently used in mass tort ac-
tions. Indeed, Celotex Corp. was an asbestos personal injury action.
Because of the potential for prolonged litigation in such cases, de-
fendants have often sought to use the summary judgment motion to
test a critical substantive element of the plaintiffs case and, there-
fore, obtain dismissal because of the plaintiffs inablility to prove her
case. For example, in the Bendectin cases involving allegations of
birth defect as a result of the ingestion by mothers of the anti-miscar-
riage drug Bendectin, the defendant Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
has used summary judgment very successfully based on plaintiffs'
failure to produce genuine proof of scientific evidence of causation. If
there is no evidence of general causation, as the defendant claims,
plaintiffs are not permitted to recover as a matter of substantive tort
law. 121 Consequently, the hearings on admissibility of evidence can
have a dispositive effect even before the summary judgment proceed-
ing begins. If there is no admissible evidence on which a claimant
tlement issue); Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1997)(creditor's action
based on federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (RICO) against
debtor, parents and bankruptcy attorneys survives summary judgment based on alle-
gations of fraud).
121. See generally, DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir.
1990); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 857 F.2d 290
(6th Cir. 1988); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.
1995). All of these cases permitted summary judgment based on a lack of scientific
evidence of causation. The crucial issue in these cases was whether plaintiffs evi-
dence of causation was admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence as expert
opinion testimony. The Supreme Court resolved the evidentiary issue in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in which the Supreme Court
found that the Federal Rules of Evidence required only that the testimony be both
reliable-i.e., scientific-and relevant-or helpful to the trier of fact. The admissibil-
ity of such evidence is decided on a case-by-case basis. The Supreme Court recently
made summary judgment motions more likely to withstand appellate review in a case
which upheld a trial court's ruling on the inadmissibility of expert testimony, adopt-
ing the abuse of discretion standard of review of the trial court's determination. See,
Joiner v. General Electric Co., 118 S.Ct. 512 (1997).
Other examples of cases in which summary judgment has been granted in tort
cases are Lager v. Chicago Northwestern Transp. Co., 122 F.3d 523 (8th Cir.
1997)(Employee brought personal injury claim against his employer under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act (FELA), for injuries sustained in attack by coworker;
employer's motion for summary judgment granted because employee's evidence insuf-
ficient to show that employer knew of coworker's alleged violent tendencies before
coworker assaulted employee); Knoblauch v. Dee Express Corp., 86 F.3d 684 (7th Cir.
1996)(plaintiff sued owners and drivers of trucks involved in initial collision arguing
that drivers' negligence was proximate cause of her decedent's death when he collided
with one of trucks; summary judgment improper because (1) material fact issues ex-
isted as to whether initial collision was proximate cause of plaintiffs decedent's death,
and whether one truck was operative after initial collision and whether driver of that
truck breached duty by failing to remove it from lane of traffic, but (2) one driver had
no duty to warn other drivers of second driver's disabled truck).
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can prove a fact in issue, and on which she has the burden of proof,
then there is no genuine issue of material fact left to resolve and
judgment as a matter of law can, and should, be entered.
VI. ALTERNATIVE PRE-TRIAL MANAGEMENT DEVICES AS SUMMARY
PROCEDURES
A. Consolidation by Use of the Federal Multidistrict Litigation
Statute
Congress created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to
coordinate or consolidate pretrial proceedings when "civil actions in-
volving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different
districts."1 22 This device is intended to create efficiencies in cases
with similar issues on discovery and motions. The Multidistrict Liti-
gation statute has been used successfully in several mass torts in the
1990s including the silicone gel breast implant litigation which began
as individual cases consolidated in one district for discovery and pre-
trial management.' 23
The use of this device is within the discretion of the Multidistrict
Panel which is comprised of seven court of appeal and district court
judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States. Proof of
the fallibility of the Multidistrict Panel can be found in early efforts
to consolidate federal asbestos cases. The judges in several federal
circuits in which thousands of asbestos cases were pending sought for
years consolidation for discovery and pre-trial management. The Ju-
dicial Panel refused for years in the face of the compelling need for
procedural assistance to increase the efficiency of the judicial system
as well as to preserve limited party resources. The Panel ultimately
approved consolidation in 1991, from which a settlement was
reached, but which was ultimately struck down by the Supreme
Court. 124 Examples of other consolidated actions include cases in-
volving allegations of product defectiveness and resulting injury from
the use of temporomandibular joints (TMJ)125 in which, after consoli-
dation, the trial judge granted motions for summary judgment on all
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994).
123. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Liab. Litig., 793 F.Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L.
1992). That litigation ultimately was certified as a class, then decertified after the
extremely high number of class participants was known, and after Dow Coming Corp.
filed for bankruptcy protection under federal bankruptcy statutes.
124. See In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F.Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L.
1991). See generally, Peterson & Selvin, "The Limited and Unlimited Power of
Courts," 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 227, 234 (1991). The consolidated actions turned
into a settlement class action under Federal Rule 23 which was decertified by the
Court of Appeals, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), and
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Amchem Prods., Inc., 117 S.Ct. 2231.
125. In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 844 F.
Supp. 1553 (J.P.M.L. 1994).
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counts against two of the defendants. 126 After the asbestos cases,
more and more mass torts are being managed through consolidation
for discovery and pre-trial procedures. 127
B. Class Actions as a Form of Summary Proceeding
Class actions are provided for in Federal Rule 23.128 Class ac-
tions provide a joinder mechanism, which did not exist prior to the
Federal Rules, which helps solve some of the inefficiencies inherent
in the federal system that comes from the dedication to individual
autonomy in litigation. When large numbers of cases involve largely
the same allegations of tortious conduct by the same parties regard-
ing the same types of injuries from the same product, the cases cry
out for some mechanism of judicial management and resolution that
does not require one-on-one issue resolution. 129 The class action per-
mits the combination of such claims in one proceeding with one dis-
covery and pre-trial management process and one resolution of
common issues. However, while attractive from a theoretical per-
spective as a summary proceeding in that large numbers of claims
are resolved, the class action for purposes of litigation is by no means
an abbreviated proceeding. Its impact as a "summary" proceeding
may be in the encouragement of settlement that results from the han-
dling of such large numbers of claims in one proceeding.1
30
Class actions are attractive to both plaintiffs and defendants and
their counsel. Allowing the global settlement of large numbers of
claims against a defendant and preventing the exhaustion of limited
resources to litigate such claims limits thedefendant's ultimate expo-
sure to the costs of the settlement. At the same time, class actions
126. 880 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Minn. 1995).
127. For additional cases involving consolidations see In re Diet Drugs, 1998 WL
12070 (J.D.M.L. 1/16/98)(consolidation order); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods.
Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 740927 (ED. Tex 1994)(sample practice and procedure order in
consolidated case); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 1998 WL 118060
(E.D.Pa. 1/12/98)(Final Pretrial Order in consolidated action).
128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. There are three types of class action; the Rule 23(b)(1)
limited fund class action where parties assert competing claims to a fund; the Rule
23(b)(2) class action where equitable relief is the goal; and the Rule 23(b)(3) common
issues class where questions of fact or law common to the class predominate over
individual issues and the class action is a superior method of adjudication. The Rule
23(b)(3) class is the one most often sought in mass tort actions.
129. On this use of class actions for mass torts for which it is not generally upheld,
see Davis, supra n. 12. See also, Peterson & Zekoll, supra n. 6, at 96-99; Cappalli &
Consolo, supra n. 27, at 248-55 (excellent survey of the American class action and
forecasting its cool reception in European countries).
130. A fuller discussion of the class action is beyond the scope of this article and
this description of the procedure is meant more as an aid for contrast than for full
explanation. Several treatises exist which discuss the procedure in detail. See Her-
bert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions (3d ed. 1996). The Supreme
Court's recent decision on the settlement class is also instructive on the difficulties
which present themselves in the mass tort class action. See Amchem Products, Inc.,
117 S.Ct. at 2245-2247.
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may permit more claimants to recover than would happen if individu-
alized trials were required. There is much debate over whether this
result is a positive one. Class actions also prevent plaintiffs from
spending excessively on the litigation by permitting the spreading of
the costs over a large group of claimants instead of just one. The high
costs inherent in preparing an individual case for trial are thereby
reduced by the class action device's combination of the claims, but
plaintiffs' counsel's fees are increased accordingly as well. 131 For the
most part, to the extent class actions are permitted in mass tort
cases, they typically lead to settlements, and as such act as, at most,
an accelerated procedure to encourage settlement rather than a sum-
mary adjudication.
1 32
C. Summary Jury Trials
A summary jury trial is, strictly speaking, an alternative dispute
resolution tool1 33 first proposed and used by Judge Thomas Lambros
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio.134 The summary jury trial, in its simplest incarnation is an
abbreviated "jury trial", administered by the district court, 35 in
which the litigants present their respective cases to a mock jury. The
summary trial is presided over by a magistrate or a district judge'
36
and is heard by a six-person jury.137 The proceeding consists of both
sides presenting their views of the case to the jury.138 Each party's
131. One of the complaints about the use of the mass tort class action is that the
cases settle with little or no effort by the plaintiffs' counsel and they earn exorbitant
fees under the contingency fee system. See the discussion of the fees in the Amchem
Products case, 117 S.Ct. at 2239, 2251 and in Coffee, supra n. 29.
132. Notable class actions in which settlements, not trial, have occurred are the
silicone gel breast implant litigation against Dow Corning and a few other defend-
ants, though the settlement was ultimately unsuccessful after the Dow Corning bank-
ruptcy. See generally Angell, supra n. 20. An example of another such settlement is
the class action litigation over the pedicle screw bone-implant which had been consoli-
dated for pre-trial proceedings and was recently settlement for $100 million for about
3,200 claimants. "Acromed Settlement Ok'd, Creates $100 Million Fund," 12 No. 5
Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Ins. (Dec. 2, 1997).
For an excellent discussion of the differing approaches to the problem of the mass
tort and how it is being handled under current judicial mechanisms, see "Summing
Up Procedural Justice: Exploring the Tension Between Collective Processes and Indi-
vidual Rights in the Context of Settlement and Litigating Classes," 30 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 785 (1997)(summary of presentations to the Section of Civil Procedure at the
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in January 1997).
133. "[Summary Jury Trial] is a flexible pretrial procedure that aids appreciably in
the settlement of trial-bound cases." Lambros, "The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution," 103 F.R.D. 461, 468 (1984).
134. The purpose of the summary jury trial is to remove roadblocks to settlement,
thus freeing up scarce judicial resources. Id.
135. William D. Quarles et al., Summary Adjudication: Dispositive Motions and
Summary Trials 223 (1991).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 103 F.R.D. at 483.
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presentation is made solely by counsel and may best be described as a
combination of opening and closing statements with expected evi-
dence mixed in.139 No testimony is taken from witnesses; physical
evidence, however, including documents, may be presented. 140 Ob-
jections during the proceeding are not encouraged unless a particu-
larly egregious action takes place.141 After hearing both parties'
presentations the jury deliberates and offers an advisory verdict that
is not binding upon the parties. The hope is that this studied esti-
mate of the value of the claims by an impartial group will encourage
a settlement. If after the summary jury trial a settlement is still not
reached, the case is scheduled for trial on the merits within 60 days of
the completion of the summary jury trial. 142
The summary jury trial was developed to deal with cases in
which the parties to the litigation adopted strategic positions, most
likely with the mistaken belief that the position counsel is advocating
has greater strength or merit than a neutral observer assigns to it. 143
The cases selected must be in a posture to go to trial, i.e., discovery
must be completed and no motions should be pending. 144
The rationale for the summary jury trial procedure is found in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's inherent power
to manage its own docket.' 45 It is a tool within the trial judge's dis-
cretion to employ or not and cannot be demanded by the parties as of
right. It has been most frequently used in the asbestos litigation
than anywhere else.
VII. CONCLUSION
Numerous summary adjudication measures in the American fed-
eral judicial system provide opportunities for parties to obtain pre-
liminary relief on a variety of bases absent a full-blown trial by jury
on the merits. It appears, however, from a review of the procedures
that the system is very much still governed by the historical, tradi-
tional American philosophy of individualism which, when all other
things are equal, leans in favor of a full, not a summary, adjudication
of the merits at the direction of the parties involved. Summary, or
139. Id. at 483.
140. Id. at 483-84.
141. Id. at 484.
142. Id. at 484.
143. Id. at 468.
144. Id. at 470.
145. The specific justification is Fed R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1), (5), (c)(11), viewed through
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 grants a broad scope to the Rules
as a whole, stating that the Rules are to be construed to "secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P.,1 (emphasis added). Rule
16 grants the court the power to direct the litigant parties to participate in pretrial
conferences in order to expedite the disposition of the action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1),
while "facilitating the settlement of the case." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
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provisional, proceedings are full of protections for the adverse party,
to insure the opportunity to be heard, fully fairly and impartially,
rather than to accomplish a goal of judicial efficiency which promotes
the public's interest in an efficient, cost-sensitive judicial system,
over the individual's interests in full adjudication of specific claims.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempt to balance the need for
"just, speedy and inexpensive" determination of justice with the fair-
ness to the individual that the United States Constitution commands,
however, and thus the summary adjudication measures discussed
have been guardedly successful in separating the "wheat"-cases
needing individualized treatment-and the "chaff'-cases that do
not.
The mass tort action has been used as a paradigm complex case
by which to judge the summary adjudication measures in place in the
United States. The-summary adjudication measures fail in most re-
spects to accommodate the particular problems of the mass tort case,
indeed of the complex case generally. Methods of summary adjudica-
tion and aggregation have been unsuccessful in effecting the efficient
resolution of cases involving similar issues and large numbers of sim-
ilarly situated claimants and defendants. The procedures which exist
to minimize delay in the American system might be improved by a
widespread recognition that the dedication to party autonomy, in
many cases to the exclusion of other legitimate goals of a judicial sys-
tem, is a nineteenth century notion for a soon-to-be twenty-first cen-
tury judicial system.
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